The Fall of An-Nuhud: Untold Details!

The Face of Truth

 

Ibrahim Shiglawi 

 

 

 

The fall of the city of An-Nuhud, despite its painful psychological and symbolic weight, must not be read in isolation from the broader context of Sudan’s liberation war. The partial event is not detached from the existential struggle the Sudanese state is waging against the project aiming to dismantle it. In this perspective, An-Nuhud is not merely a city, but a point within the broader web of confrontation, and every shift in control or its recovery is subject to a broader strategic assessment.

 

In this article, we attempt to explore that by examining the army’s strategies in managing the battle and their reflection on the broader Sudanese scene.

 

 

The retreat of the Sudanese army in An-Nuhud cannot be described as a “defeat” in the strict military sense, but rather as a calculated tactical withdrawal within a broader war of attrition. The aim is to exhaust the core strength of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and to relocate the battle to areas more suitable for air and artillery strikes.

 

This maneuver reflects an advanced military understanding of modern warfare, where gains are not measured solely by territorial control, but by the ability to dismantle and drain enemy forces, and to drag them into key battle zones to remove them from the strategic equation.

 

 

Politically, the attack on An-Nuhud is an attempt by the militia to create a new field reality that strengthens its position at the negotiating table—something its political proxies are actively pursuing regionally.

 

A unified reading of the events places these movements within the realm of political maneuvers cloaked in military operations, as battles are no longer ends in themselves but tools of negotiation in an open conflict between the project of the state and the project of chaos.

 

 

 

The response of the army’s General Command was characterized by strategic composure, recognizing that Sudan’s war is a battle of wills. The fall of a city does not signify the loss of the war, but rather represents a phase in a larger battle, the outcome of which is measured by its overall results—not by temporary or situational field fluctuations.
This aligns with the famous quote by German commander Erwin Rommel: “War is like chess—the victor is the one who thinks about his second and third moves.”

 

 

 

The militia’s swift movement in An-Nuhud and Al-Khowei coincided with clear attempts to disrupt the army’s advance toward El Fasher, through what can be described as “dispersed attacks to distract attention.” However, the army handled the situation with skill, avoiding direct confrontations and choosing to reorganize its lines based on proven strategies.

 

 

It executed an organized withdrawal from An-Nuhud to protect civilians and infrastructure, luring the militia into well-planned ambushes. The army relied on air power and the “Hunter” mobile unit, which demonstrated high combat efficiency. This strategy has already proven successful in Al-Jazira, Khartoum, and other regions, by weakening the militia’s capabilities and striking its logistical and command networks.

 

 

 

From an ethical and political standpoint, the scene reveals a structural flaw in the positions of some political forces, as well as a deep moral and political crisis. This is evident in the silence of certain factions regarding the massacres committed by RSF forces in An-Nuhud, which resulted in the death of over 300 civilians—including women and children—and the looting of hospitals and markets, according to the Sudanese Doctors Network.

 

In contrast, the government, through Minister of Information and official spokesperson Khalid Al-Eyesir, affirmed that Sudan is fighting a battle of existence, rejecting political blackmail under the guise of military operations, while some factions chose silence out of concern for their own interests.

 

 

 

An-Nuhud—like Sinja, Wad Madani, and Khartoum before it—will return, but only after contributing to shaping the military mindset managing the battle, a mindset that must learn more from defeats than it celebrates victories.
As Field Marshal Abdel Rahman Suwar al-Dahab once said: “A true army learns more from its defeats than its victories.”

 

This is the lesson upon which the grand liberation strategy relies—one that doesn’t look at what lies underfoot, but instead considers the entire map.

 

 

The most significant shift that can be concluded from the An-Nuhud battle is the army’s success in forcing the militia to withdraw its elite units from Darfur toward Kordofan, thereby reducing pressure on El Fasher and opening the door for a realignment of combat priorities, while preventing the militia from concentrating its forces in Darfur.

 

 

 

According to what we observe from #TheFaceOfTruth, a discerning view of events teaches us that this battle is not a local skirmish, but a comprehensive one. Victory will not be achieved through arms alone, but through national unity and ethical-political legitimacy.

 

 

This war is a battle for existence—not for positions. Every temporary setback is merely preparation for an inevitable victory.

 

An-Nuhud will return—soon—with new awareness and unforgettable lessons. Victory is not built on emotion, but on perseverance, patience, and unity.

 

This battle is a test of national will and the people’s trust in their army and leadership.

 

As long as the people remain united, and the army committed to the grand liberation plan… these are the details we must know.

 

 

Wishing you health and well-being.