Haftar and the New Sudanese Calculations

Face of Truth 

 

 

Ibrahim Shglawi

Shglawi55@gmail.com

 

The morning of June 10 was far from ordinary in the context of Sudan’s war, now entering its third year. It marked a significant and dangerous escalation with the announcement by the Sudanese Armed Forces that border points within the Sudan-Egypt-Libya triangle had come under joint attack by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), backed directly by Libyan General Khalifa Haftar’s forces—specifically his “Salafist Brigade.”

 

 

This development represents a qualitative shift, signaling a possible transition of the Sudanese conflict from an internal war to a broader regional entanglement, where interests, ambitions, and power struggles intertwine.

 

 

According to Sudan News Platform, Haftar’s support for the rebel militia went beyond battlefield coordination.

 

Weapons and equipment were reportedly transported through Kufra, and Emirati-supplied surveillance drones were used, in addition to IL-76TD cargo planes seen operating in the area. These indicators suggest that the attack was a calculated move, part of a broader plan formulated in regional power centers that have long supported the militia’s war effort, seeking to reshape the balance of power after RSF losses in North Darfur, West Kordofan, White Nile, and Khartoum.

 

 

 

The contested border triangle has always been a sensitive flashpoint where the interests of Khartoum, Cairo, and Tripoli intersect. Although the attack was executed by Libyan and Sudanese rebel hands, the invisible hands of regional actors—particularly the UAE—appear behind the curtain. Abu Dhabi is increasingly accused of managing the RSF’s logistical and financial networks via southern Libya, especially after the traditional supply routes through Chad were disrupted in recent months.

 

 

Against this backdrop, a notable development came from Chad. President Mahamat Idriss Déby sent a congratulatory Eid message to Sudan’s Sovereign Council leader, Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. While seemingly routine, the message held political significance, as it marked the first official contact between the two nations after months of strained relations, during which Sudan accused Chad of sheltering RSF fighters and turning a blind eye to arms transits.

 

 

 

This gesture could be read as a Chadian attempt to de-escalate or gradually pull back from the conflict, likely driven by security concerns tied to the cross-border Zaghawa tribe and fears of the war spilling into Chadian territory. Internally, Chad’s military has reportedly grown uneasy with its role in facilitating RSF support, especially under mounting Western pressure and a shifting international stance toward the Sudan conflict.

 

 

 

Though not officially declared, this Chadian retrenchment is seen by observers as a key factor prompting the UAE to seek alternative logistical routes—ultimately finding a suitable proxy in Haftar’s axis. Haftar offers a geographically and politically convenient channel that enables continued RSF support without high political cost, at least for now.

 

Thus, the Libyan shift appears to establish a new supply line, potentially more robust than the waning Chadian route.

 

 

Egypt, mentioned by name in Sudanese military statements and ever-present by geography, now faces a complex dilemma. Haftar’s forces, which led the assault on the border triangle, rarely move without coordination with Cairo and are considered its strategic arm in eastern Libya. Yet, the timing of the attack—right after President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s visit to Abu Dhabi, amid reports of Emirati pressure on Cairo regarding Rafah and Gaza—has raised questions. Some speculate that the Libyan move, backed by Abu Dhabi, could be a subtle message to Egypt: “The south could ignite if you don’t compromise in the east.”

 

 

 

If these interpretations hold true, the conflict is not merely about supply routes or spheres of influence. It reflects a deeper power struggle within the same regional bloc—between a financier (the UAE) and a geographic guarantor (Egypt), both of whom now realize that their diverging agendas may risk igniting internal conflict.

 

 

Looking ahead, several scenarios are possible:

 

 

The Sudanese army may continue its decisive response, as seen in recent days with airstrikes that inflicted heavy losses on the militia and its backers.

 

 

Alternatively, the new Libyan supply route might become a de facto reality that all actors must contend with.

 

 

A third possibility involves direct Egyptian intervention to rein in Haftar and align his actions with Egypt’s interests and Sudanese cooperation.

 

 

A fourth scenario could see new players, like Turkey, stepping in to reshape the dynamics in their favor.

In this complex scene, Khartoum has a valuable diplomatic opportunity that must not be missed. If it can capitalize on Chad’s message and turn it into a security negotiation track aimed at closing the western front, it would mark significant progress in weakening RSF’s ability to regroup—especially as the militia faces growing military pressure in Darfur.

 

 

If Sudan succeeds in restoring ties with Chad and strategically pressuring regional actors who support the rebellion, it could isolate the RSF regionally and open a new pathway toward peace—especially as diplomatic movements begin to emerge between Ankara and Doha.

 

 

Wishing you all well and in good health.